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Abstract—A new framework for a secure and robust consensus
in blockchain-based IoT networks is proposed using machine
learning. Hyperledger fabric, which is a blockchain platform
developed as part of the Hyperledger project, though looks
very apt for IoT applications, has comparatively low tolerance
for malicious activities in an untrustworthy environment. To
that end, we propose AI-enabled blockchain (AIBC) with a 2-
step consensus protocol that uses an outlier detection algorithm
for consensus in an IoT network implemented on hyperledger
fabric platform. The outlier-aware consensus protocol exploits a
supervised machine learning algorithm which detects anomaly ac-
tivities via a learned detector in the first step. Then, the data goes
through the inherent Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT)
consensus protocol in the hyperledger fabric for ledger update.
We measure and report the performance of our framework with
respect to the various delay components. Results reveal that our
implemented AIBC network (2-step consensus protocol) improves
hyperledger fabric performance in terms of fault tolerance by
marginally compromising the delay performance.
Index Terms—Blockchain; Artificial intelligence (AI); Con-
sensus protocol; Hyperledger fabric; Internet of Things (IoT);
Outlier detection.
I. INTRODUCTION
The wide spread deployment of IoT devices is enabling the
automation of various aspects in our daily lives. One of the
success stories of IoTs has been the automation of homes and
cities which are referred as smart homes and smart cities. A
significant obstacle towards realizing the true vision of smart
homes is securing the communicated and stored data in the
home network against malicious acts desiring to wreak havoc
with someone’s home [1].
Though there are many competing technologies that try to
immune data in smart homes against attacks, blockchain has
emerged as probably the most promising for both i) securing
the home network against manipulation attacks on stored data
and ii) providing a secure platform for all the devices in
the network to communicate with each other [2], [3]. In a
blockchain, the data is immutable because of the underlying
consensus protocols– a process by which all transactions are
validated by all the nodes [4]. Therefore, manipulation attacks
on transmitted or stored data are not plausible through a
single compromised node and majority of nodes ought to be
compromised for a successful attack [5]. Different consensus
protocols and their applicability towards IoT networks can be
found in [1], [6].
This research was partially funded by Cyber Florida’s Collaborative Seed
Award program.
Using blockchain for the IoT devices in a smart home
is non-trivial. This is primarily because the IoT devices are
resource-constrained and might not be able to perform the
extensive computations required to achieve consensus. For
example, blockchain consensus protocols such as Proof of
Work is contingent upon solving compute-intensive hash func-
tions, having storage requirements, and needing low-latency
communication links [7]. Resource-constrained devices cannot
fulfill these requirements [8]. Recently, several novel con-
sensus approaches have been proposed to overcome these
limitations. One of the projects which tries to address these
challenges is the hyperledger project [6]– which is what we
chose as our evaluation platform in this research.
We implement a blockchain-based IoT smart home net-
work on hyperledger fabric which has low computational
requirements and fast network response time that makes it
desirable for IoT applications [6], [8]. Hyperledger fabric uses
practical byzantine fault tolerance (PBFT) method which can
successfully reach consensus over new data if the ratio of
malicious devices is less than 1/3 [9]. On the other hand, most
of the devices in a home network are resource constrained and
very vulnerable to different types of cyber-attacks. Therefore,
we should define a mechanism to detect malicious activities
and the compromised devices and disconnect them from the
rest of the network in order to exclude them from participating
in the PBFT consensus protocol.
In this paper, we propose the AI-enabled blockchain (AIBC)
network with a 2-step consensus protocol using an outlier
detection algorithm as the first step and PBFT as the sec-
ond one. Outlier detection algorithm discovers anomalies in
multimodal data that is captured by the various IoT devices
in a smart home network. We use multimodal data fusion to
map the different data types received from different devices to
an intermediate domain. Since the captured data from different
sensors are not independent of each other, the outlier detection
algorithm aims to learn the intrinsic structure of the data
and exploits the inter-dependencies among data from different
devices. Eventually, outlier data is rejected at the end of the
first step and the corresponding device is refrained from going
to the second consensus step (PBFT). Thus, the overall fault
tolerance of the blockchain network is enhanced in comparison
to a naive hyperledger fabric implementation. Fig. 1 shows the
intuition of our proposed 2-step consensus protocol.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first research
work that tries to practically apply machine learning to reach
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Fig. 1: The 2-step consensus protocol in our proposed AIBC
network. The attack ratio in this schematic is 37.5% which PBFT
cannot tolerate in a conventional blockchain network. However, the
AIBC network with outlier detector will attenuate the attack impact
to 20% in the first step which can successfully go through PBFT as
the second step consensus protocol.
consensus in a blockchain network. Gupta et al. have suggested
the possibility of applying machine learning techniques to
blockchain’s consensus process as a future research work
without any investigation [10]. Dinh et al. have discussed the
benefits of integration of blockchain and artificial intelligence
(AI) [11]. They suggest that a blockchain governed by a
machine learning algorithm might be able to detect attacks
and invoke proper defence mechanisms or isolate the com-
promised component. We have successfully formulated and
implemented this idea called AI-enabled blockchain (AIBC).
Dey has proposed a utility function similar to the function used
in [5] to detect anomaly [12]. Then, he claims this value can be
used as a feed for a supervised machine learning algorithm to
measure the likeliness of an attack and prevent the blockchain
confirmation of that transaction in the consensus protocol.
However, he does not propose an algorithm or implementation
to design a practical consensus protocol.
In order to test the validity of our 2-step consensus protocol
for IoT networks, we implement a 3-layer architecture using
hyperledger fabric. The first layer is the application layer
containing different IoT devices. The second and third layers
are the edge blockchain layer and the core blockchain layer
that contain different components of the AIBC.
We measure the latency of different parts of our implemen-
tation and the number of outlier devices in each time unit
using synthetic data represented as a matrix. We compare
our proposed architecture with the conventional hyperledger
fabric implementation and investigate the effect of the outlier
detection algorithm on fault tolerance. Results reveal that our
proposed AIBC network can reach consensus over new data
in milliseconds with better fault tolerance than a naive hyper-
ledger fabric implementation. This is achieved by detecting the
malicious devices in the first consensus step and prohibiting
them from participating in the PBFT step.
II. PROPOSED SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we discuss the proposed 3-layer architecture
and the communication protocol between the different com-
ponents of the implemented AIBC network.
A. Three-layer Architecture
The topology of our implemented 3-layer network is il-
lustrated in Fig. 2. The first layer is the application layer
containing n smart devices, smart meters, and sensors (A1
to An) within a smart home network. The second layer is the
edge blockchain layer that includes m endorsing peers (Pe1
to Pem ) and data aggregators. This layer endorses the new
transactions (Tx1 to Txn) from applications and is partially
responsible for the 2-step consensus protocol. The third layer
is the core blockchain layer consisting of an orderer and z
regular peers (P1 to Pz). This layer creates a block out of
the received endorsed transactions (R1/E1 to Rn/En, where
R and E denote transaction results and their corresponding
endorsements respectively) from the application layer and is
also responsible for the 2-step consensus protocol.
There are n organizations (Org1 to Orgn) in the AIBC
network each of which contains one application, at least
one endorsing peer (n ≤ m), none or few regular peers
(n ≤ z or n ≥ z ). For ease of illustration, only one regular
peer and one endorsing peer are shown in each organization
in Fig. 2. Endorsing peers have an aggregator to receive
data (transactions) from the application layer, a copy of the
chaincode (also known as smart contract, shown as C) to
endorse new transactions, a copy of the ledger (shown as L),
and the detector (shown as Det) to participate in the 2-step
consensus protocol. Regular peers have only one copy of the
ledger and the detector for participation in the 2-step consensus
protocol to enhance the security of the blockchain network.
Peers (both endorsing and regular) are involved in the 2-step
consensus protocol. Thereby, as the number of peers (m and
z) increases, more of them ought to be infected in order to
prevent a successful consensus.
B. Communication protocol in AIBC network
There exist two different communication protocols in the
AIBC network: query process and invoke process.
1) Query Process: In query process, an application con-
nects to an arbitrary endorsing or regular peer to get updated
about the current state of the ledger. This process requires
only three steps: (i) the application connects to a peer directly
(without an aggregator), (ii) the application sends query re-
quest to the peer, and (iii) the peer accesses its copy of ledger
and sends the result back to the application.
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Fig. 2: The topology of our implemented 3-layer AIBC network.
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Fig. 3: The invoke process communication protocol in the imple-
mented AIBC network using a relay switch.
2) Invoke Process: During this process, an application
connects to its corresponding endorsing peers to request a
change in the ledger by its new data. A simplified version
of our implementation with just one application (A1) and its
corresponding endorsing peer (Pe1 ) is delineated in Fig. 3 to
clarify the communication protocol in an invoke process. It
should be noted that there are other applications, other endors-
ing peers and regular peers as shown in Fig. 2. Other endorsing
peers communicate with their corresponding application and
simultaneously traverse all the communication steps shown in
Fig. 3 (steps 1 to 7) whereas the regular peers go through
steps 5 and 6 only. The invoke process has three phases: (i)
the endorsement phase (denoted with solid lines), (ii) the 2-
step consensus protocol (denoted with dashed lines) and (iii)
the ledger update (denoted with dotted lines) in Fig. 3.
Endorsement Phase: This phase has 4 steps:
1. In this step, each application needs to connect to one or
more endorsing peers according to the endorsement policy (not
arbitrarily). Endorsement policy delineates which endorsing
peers from which organizations are required to endorse a
new transaction (Tx) proposed by an application (A). In our
implementation, each application communicates with only one
endorsing peer as shown in Fig. 2.
2. The application (A1) reads from a smart device, and sends
its new readings to its corresponding endorsing peer (shown
as Pe1 ) in the AIBC network.
2.1. The endorsing peer executes the new transaction (data)
in its copy of chaincode to endorse it.
2.2. If the transaction get endorsed successfully, the chain-
code temporarily updates that endorsing peer’s copy of ledger
as a proposed update.
3. The endorsing peer sends the result of the proposed trans-
action (R1 ) along with its endorsement (E1 ) obtained by
the endorsing peer’s digital signature to the corresponding
application.
4. The application checks all the received results along with
their corresponding endorsements from corresponding endors-
ing peers to have the same result with valid endorsements.
If these requirements are met, the application sends the result
with its corresponding endorsements to the orderer to be added
in the new block.
2-step Consensus Protocol: The two steps of the consensus
protocol consist of the detector (which detects the outliers)
and execution of PBFT.
5. The orderer combines all the received transaction results and
their corresponding endorsements in a new block and sends
it to all the peers (both endorsing and regular) to initiate the
2-step consensus protocol.
Step 1: Detector.
5.1(a) Each peer checks all the transactions within the block
via its detector that uses the outlier detection algorithm
discussed in Section III to find outlier data and reject it.
5.1(b) The detector excludes the peers associated with the
organization containing the application that generated the
outlier data from participating in the second step consensus. To
do so, the detector updates the relay switch in order to notify
its corresponding peer which set of peers (both endorsing and
regular) it must connect to for the second step consensus. This
step can prevent more than 33.3% of compromised nodes to
intervene in the PBFT consensus protocol to some extent–
the exact fraction depends on the accuracy of the detector
(discussed in Section III-C).
Step 2: PBFT.
5.2 Each peer verifies whether each of the transactions in the
new block is endorsed by all the required peers specified in the
endorsement policy. In addition, they check if the result of a
specific transaction is the same from all the required endorsing
peers. This is to ensure that the application is not compromised
and has not sent an incorrect result for the transaction. All the
transactions in the block are labeled as valid or invalid after
verification of the endorsements by each of the peers. Then,
the peers connects to their trusted set of peers according to the
obtained relay switch in the previous step to reach a consensus
over the new block using PBFT method.
Ledger Update: After the completion of the consensus pro-
tocol, the invoke process is finalized as:
6. Each peer updates its copy of ledger.
7. Applications get notified about the ledger update.
III. OUTLIER DETECTION
In order to detect malicious devices, we propose to employ
machine learning for outlier detection as the first step of
consensus. To that aim, the low-rank assumption is considered
as the core model which is a popular assumption in machine
learning [13]. We implement the outlier detector using a
secondary chaincode which is installed on all the peers in the
blockchain network (shown by Det in Fig. 2). To apply the
outlier detection algorithm to the multi-modal data gathered
from different sensors and devices, we need to first fuse the
data for a unified representation.
A. Multimodal Data Fusion
Sensors and devices in a smart home deal with different
types of data. To impose a model for the ensemble of data in
AI-enabled systems, we need to map the data to a meaningful
intermediate domain [14]. The data from device n at time
slot t is denoted by dnt ∈ Rbn where bn is the dimension of
received data from sensor n. Let dt ∈ Rb represent the fused
data at the tth time slot where b =
∑
bn. Matrix D ∈ Rb×T
represents collected data from N devices over T time slots.
In other words, D = [d1 · · · , dT ].
B. Outlier Detection Algorithm
For detecting inconsistent data, we use low-rank data struc-
ture which is a typical assumption for many real-life data [15].
This model is one of the most well-known data structures in
signal processing and data mining [16]. However, considering
the recent advances in AI, deep learning methods and non-
linear models can also be imposed [17], [18]. Without loss of
generality, the low-rank model is assumed in the present paper.
Matrix D contains the training data to design the detector via
rank decomposition model. The rank decomposition model can
be constructed via singular value decomposition (SVD) of D
as follows,
D = UΛV T =
rank∑
r=1
λrurv
T
r , (1)
where, diag(Λ) = [λi] contains singular values of D. Trans-
pose of V is indicated by V T . Moreover, columns of U
and V are right singular vectors and left singular vectors,
respectively. The rank of D is upper bounded by Rmax=
min(T, b). Rank of a matrix is equal to the minimum number
of rank-one components that holds Eq. (1). However, the actual
rank of a typical data could be much smaller than Rmax as the
measurements from devices are dependent on each other. The
goal of the outlier detection algorithm is to learn the possible
dependencies and detect those patterns that do not agree with
the rest of the measurements. By rejecting the inconsistent
data, the blockchain network becomes AI-enabled. In AIBC,
the devices associated with inconsistent data are excluded to
go to the next consensus step. The low-rank approximation of
the measurements can be written as follows,
D˜ =
Rest∑
r=1
λrurv
T
r , (2)
where, D˜ is the best low-rank approximation of D. Moreover,
parameter Rest can be estimated by analyzing the singular
values. Rank is the minimum number of learned patterns such
that data of all devices in a block can be represented as a linear
combination of those patterns. Using the training data and the
estimated rank, a margin around the model can be identified.
TABLE I: Summarization of parameters in the employed model.
Model’s
parameter Variable Description
Span U ∈ Rb×R
Span of the model (regular pat-
terns are linear combination of
these bases.)
Estimated
rank Rest
The number of basic patterns in
the span.
Threshold h ∈ Rb
Threshold for the margin be-
tween trustworthy and outlier
data.
A straightforward criterion for rank estimation is based on the
Frobenius norm of residual.
Rest = min R s.t.
‖D −∑Rr=1 λrurvTr ‖F
‖D‖F ≤ . (3)
Here,  is a constant between 0 and 1. As  increases,
the required rank decreases. Let us define matrix Z as the
difference of D and D˜, i.e., Z = D − D˜. Each row of
Z corresponds to the estimated perturbation of a device.
The threshold for margin of each device is defined by hn,
which is a function of the desired false alarm probability of
detector. The parameters of the employed low rank model are
summarized in Table I. The learned detector is characterized
by [U , Rest,h]. Vector h is concatenation of [h1, · · · , hd].
The input data at time slot t, dt, must be analyzed according
to the learned detector by training data D. First, dt should be
projected on the span of the learned detector as:
d˜t = U(U
TU)−1UTdt, (4)
where, d˜t is the projection of dt on the low-rank model.
The residual of the projection is defined as the difference of
the measured data and the projected data on the model, i.e.,
zt = dt − d˜t. This residual vector contains the mismatch of
N devices for time t. The value of zt(n) is the metric for
decision on detecting outliers, i.e., if |zt(n)| is greater than
the threshold, hn, the measured data violates the margin of
the model.
Algorithm 1 Outlier rejection based on low-rank model
Require: training data (D), online time series dt and Pfa.
1: compute U , Σ and V using Eq. (1).
Initialization:
2: model.rank ← estimate using Eq. (3).
3: model.bases ← U(:, 1 : model.rank).
4: model.thresholds ← select thresholds based on Pfa.
for a new time slot collect dt from n devices
5: d˜t ← project dt on the span of model Eq. (4).
6: z = dt − d˜t.
for each device (n) that |zn| >model.thresholds(n)
7: Outlier(t) ← Outlier(t) ⋃ {n}
end for
C. Performance Analysis
A conventional hyperledger fabric network can tolerate up
to 1/3 malicious devices. However, proposed AIBC network
can significantly increase this threshold by a carefully de-
signed detector. There are two probabilities associated with an
outlier detection algorithm: probability of detection (Pd) and
probability of false alarm (Pfa). Probability of miss detection
(complement of probability of detection) corresponds to the
case that our algorithm fails to detect a malicious node.
Probability of false alarm is associated with the scenario that
the algorithm discerns an intact node as a malicious node.
According to these two values, the fault tolerance of our
proposed architecture can be improved in comparison with the
naive PBFT consensus protocol. However, there exist the case
that the performance of our architecture be less than 33.3%
which is only possible if the detector is not well-designed such
that it has a very high probability of false alarm or a very low
probability of detection.
The impact of the designed detector on the fault tolerance
of the AIBC network is illustrated in the following inequality:
Fdet = Fraw(1− Pd) + (1− Fraw)Pfa ≤ 1
3
. (5)
In this inequality, Fdet denotes the fault tolerance of the AIBC
network over the filtered data using the designed detector.
For successful execution of PBFT consensus in the second
step consensus, Fdet should be less than 1/3. Fraw is the
initial fault tolerance of our network in the first step before
performing outlier detection which can be greater than 1/3.
However, in a conventional hyperledger fabric, there is no
detector and the fault tolerance (equivalent to Fraw in our
AIBC network) should be less than 1/3. The effect of the
detector on the threshold is investigated via implementation.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS AND RESULTS
We implemented the proposed 3-layer AIBC network us-
ing hyperledger fabric framework version 1.1.0. The code
is written in chaincode using Golang. Following are the
hardware specifications of the two laptops we used: Core i7-
6500U processor, CPU 2.5 GHz × 4, Ubuntu 18.04 LTS. First,
we explain the architecture of the implemented network and
the dataset we used. Then, we present the performance of
the implemented AIBC network in terms of latency and the
accuracy of the outlier detection algorithm.
A. Network architecture and dataset
We have simulated the application layer with 100 sensors
and devices using Matlab. These devices send their data to the
AIBC network in each time unit. The edge blockchain and core
blockchain layers are simulated on two separate but similar
laptops. Different components of the AIBC network including
all the peers and orderer are defined in separate containers
using Docker. These containers can communicate with each
other through a channel. The containers in the two laptops are
connected using Docker swarm.
The implemented chaincode has three main functions: init,
invoke, and query. Init function is used for initializing the
number of sensors in layer 1 and their names, and initializing
the blockchain with the first input data from the devices.
Invoke function is used to receive new data from devices
in layer 1. Each time an application sends new data to an
aggregator, invoke function is executed which sends back the
result after endorsement to that application. Query function is
used to obtain the current value of a device in the IoT network.
The detector is also implemented using Golang. It has init
and invoke functions. Init function initializes the peers with
number of devices and their names and initializes primary data
model in AIBC. The primary data model is obtained through
outlier detection algorithm from a synthesized dataset. We use
a 100× 100 matrix where each column is new data obtained
from an IoT network with 100 devices. Invoke function is
responsible for updating the data model through the outlier
detection algorithm, detecting outlier data within a block, and
(a) (b)
Fig. 4: Acceptable and unavoidable delays. (a) Outlier detection
algorithm delay, (b) Devices state update delay.
(a) (b)
Fig. 5: Unacceptable and avoidable delays. (a) Model update delay,
(b) Dataset update delay.
discarding it. After a block is sent to the peers by the orderer,
invoke function of the detector is executed on each peer for
execution of step-1 of the consensus protocol. It will discard
the outlier data from that block and send the result to the peer
to initiate the step-2 of the consensus protocol.
B. Network Latency
There are several delays for the invoke function of the
designed detector: outlier detection algorithm delay, model
update delay, dataset update delay, and devices state update
delay. Outlier detection algorithm delay is the time spent to
execute this algorithm to infer outlier data in the latest 100
readings from 100 devices in the Layer 1. Model update
delay is the time it takes to update the model obtained by
outlier detection algorithm. It should be mentioned that outlier
detection is a machine learning algorithm in which the learned
detector is updated at each time based on the observed data.
The model is updated based on the last 100 readings from
different devices in Layer 1. Dataset update delay is the delay
associated with updating the last 100 readings from all 100
devices in the ledger. Devices state update delay is the time
spent to update new values of the devices in the ledger.
We show the probability density function (pdf) of all the
mentioned delays for our implemented IoT network with 100
Dataset Update Model Update Outlier Detection Device Update10
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Fig. 6: Latency of different sections of the AIBC network.
devices in 951 time slots in Figs. 4 and 5. A hyperledger fabric
network reach consensus over a new block in milliseconds [6]
and adding that block to the copy of ledger would take about
5 microseconds according to Fig. 4(b). These delays exist
in any hyperledger fabric implementation and are acceptable
for a smart home network. Our designed detector would add
some new delay components for the network. Outlier detection
algorithm would take about 9.5 milliseconds as shown in
Fig. 4(a) which will not affect the performance of a smart
home network. However, according to Fig. 5, model update
delay and dataset update delay will take about 1.14 and 5.65
seconds respectively which is not acceptable for a smart home
network. However, dataset update delay and model update
delay can be easily eliminated if we use pre-learned data using
a proper dataset. Therefore, our proposed architecture will
incur an additional delay of about 9.5 milliseconds for outlier
detection which is acceptable for a smart home network since
consensus is reached in milliseconds. The delays for different
sections of our implementation are compared in Fig. 6.
C. Two-step Consensus Protocol Accuracy
The last factor to evaluate our implementation is the ac-
curacy of our proposed algorithm in terms of probability of
detection and probability of false alarm and its impact on
the fault tolerance of the proposed architecture. The fault
tolerance for different probabilities of detection and false alarm
is illustrated in Fig. 7(a). Fault tolerance of less than 33.3% is
denoted as fail zone which is only possible if the detector is
designed very inexpertly with a significantly high probability
of false alarm or low probability of detection. In general,
the performance of the network is enhanced and the fault
tolerance of the AIBC network for different detectors (different
probability of detection and probability of false alarm) is found
to be more than 33.3%, more than 40%, or more than 50% as
shown in Fig. 7(a).
Fig. 7(b) shows the accuracy of our algorithm on a synthe-
sized dataset with large number of faulty devices. Although
there exists a large number of malicious devices (outlier
data) in the dataset, the detector is learned such that the
fault tolerance of the network is more than 50%. This is
inferred by choosing any operating point in Fig. 7(b) and the
corresponding point in Fig. 7(a). As an example, an operating
point of the detector is shown at Pfa = 5% and Pd = 46%.
The fault tolerance of the network in this point is 57.82%
according to Inequality (5).
V. CONCLUSIONS
We proposed the AIBC network with a 2-step consensus
protocol using outlier detection algorithm and PBFT. Outlier
detection algorithm acts as the first step consensus and verifies
the compatibility of new data and discards the suspicious
ones in order to increase fault tolerance of the network for
the second step consensus (PBFT). We measured the latency,
accuracy, and performance of our method. Results reveal
significant increase in the fault tolerance of hyperledger fabric
by our detector. We employed an outlier detection scheme,
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Fig. 7: Detector Performance. (a) Fault tolerance of the proposed
algorithm, (b) Accuracy of the proposed outlier detector for a dataset
with large number of faulty devices.
however, recent advances in artificial intelligence such as
deep learning and reinforcement learning can be exploited for
designing the detector in a more robust manner.
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